The government has recently consulted on the structure of alcohol taxes. This consultation focuses on two issues: (i) the introduction of a new still cider and perry band that would increase the tax on products below 7.5% ABV, and (ii) the introduction of a new still wine band that would reduce the tax on products between 5.5% and 8.5% ABV. Here we summarise the main points from our response to the consultation.
The government has recently consulted on the structure of alcohol taxes. This consultation focuses on two issues: (i) the introduction of a new still cider and perry band that would increase the tax on products below 7.5% ABV, and (ii) the introduction of a new still wine band that would reduce the tax on products between 5.5% and 8.5% ABV.
In this Observation we summarise our main points from our response to the consultation.
We consider reforms that raise carbon prices faced by households and reduce the variation in carbon prices across gas and electricity use, improving the efficiency of emissions reduction.
We examine the optimal auditing problem of a tax authority when taxpayers can choose both to evade and avoid. For a convex penalty function the incentive-compatibility constraints may bind for the richest taxpayer and at a positive level of both evasion and avoidance. The audit function is non-increasing in reported income, and is higher for progressive tax functions than for regressive tax functions. Higher marginal tax rates increase the incentives for non-compliance, overturning the well-known Yitzhaki paradox.
Andrew Hood contributed an article to this bulletin titled 'The changing generosity of private pension provision and its differential effects across generations'
We estimate marginal propensities to consume from wealth shocks for Italian households in the early part of the Great Recession. Large asset price shocks in 2008 underpin an IV estimator. A euro fall in risky financial wealth resulted in cuts in annual total (non‐durable) consumption of 8.5‐ 9 (5.5‐5.7) cents. There is evidence of effects on food spending. Responses of total and nondurable spending to changes in housing wealth are 0.2 to 0.3 cents/euro. Point estimates of the effect of the financial wealth shock are larger if the youngest and/or oldest households are excluded. Results indicate that responses to the wealth shock were stronger for those who became pessimistic about the stock market, and for those owners of risky assets who also held mortgage debt. Counterfactuals indicate financial wealth effects were important (relative to other factors) for consumption falls in Italy in 2007/08.
