Dr Imran Rasul

We consider a principal–agent model of adverse selection where, in order to trade with the principal, the agent must undertake a relationship-specific investment which affects his outside option to trade, i.e. the payoff that he can obtain by trading with an alternative principal.

We present evidence on the effect of social connections between workers and managers on productivity in the workplace.

This paper presents evidence on the social capital in one particular firm, as embodied in the friendship ties among its workers.

We analyze the role of the marriage contract.

We present evidence from a firm level experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial compensation from fixed wages to performance pay based on the average productivity of lower-tier workers.

This paper presents evidence on whether and how a household's behaviour is influenced by the presence and characteristics of its extended family.

We present evidence on how farmers’ decisions to adopt a new crop relate to the adoption choices of their network of family and friends.

This paper develops a model of search and learning in marriage markets to analyze how a liberalization of divorce laws affects marriage market outcomes.

I develop a model of marriage in which spouses decide on investments in child quality during marriage, and on the allocation of child custody should they divorce.

We present evidence on whether workers have social preferences by comparing workers' productivity under relative incentives, where individual effort imposes a negative externality on others, with their productivity under piece rates, where it does not.