Professor Pierre-André Chiappori

Measuring how assortative matching differs between two economies is difficult, we show how the use of different measures can create different outcomes

In this paper, we present evidence on changes in assortative mating and its implications for household inequality in the UK.

The extent to which like-with like marry is particularly important for inequality as well as for the outcomes of children that result from the union.

In this paper, we develop an equilibrium lifecycle model of education, marriage and labor supply and consumption in a transferable utility context.

We develop an equilibrium lifecycle model of education, marriage and labor supply and consumption in a transferable utility context.

This paper derives sufficient conditions for nonparametric transformation models to be identified and develops estimators of the identified components.

The authors develop an equilibrium lifecycle model of education, marriage and labor supply and consumption in a transferable utility context. The model is estimated using the British HPS.

The authors derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour.

Hedonic pricing with quasilinear preferences is shown to be equivalent to stable matching with transferable utilities and a participation constraint, and to an optimal transportation (Monge-Kantorovich) linear programming problem.

Hedonic pricing with quasilinear preferences is shown to be equivalent to stable matching with transferable utilities and a participation constraint, and to an optimal transportation (Monge-Kantorovich) linear programming problem.

We present identification and estimation results for the "collective" model of labour supply in which there are discrete choices, censoring of hours, and non-participation in employment.

We present identification and estimation results for the “collective” model of labour supply in which there are discrete choices, censoring of hours, and non-participation in employment.

We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour.

We extend the collective model of household behavior to allow for the existence of public consumption.

We extend the collective model of household behavior to allow for the existence of public consumption.

We extend the collective model of household behavior to allow for the existence of public consumption.

In this paper we develop the collective labour supply framework to allow for corner solutions and nonparticipation in employment.