Dr Monica Costa Dias

A comparison of hazard rates of duration outcomes before and after policy changes is hampered by non-identification if there is unobserved heteogeneity in the effects and no model structure is imposed. We develop a discontinuity approach that overcomes this by exploiting variation in the moment at which different cohorts are exposed to the policy change, i.e. by considering spells crossing the policy change.

This paper considers the impact of Tax credits and income support programs on female education choice, employment, hours and human capital accumulation over the life-cycle.

We consider the impact of tax credits and income support programs on female education choice, employment, hours and human capital accumulation over the life-cycle.

In this paper, we use a dynamic model to show how a lifecycle perspective alters our impression of the effect of the tax and benefit system on female work incentives.

Matching methods for treatment evaluation based on a conditional independence assumption do not balance selective unobserved differences between treated and non-treated. We derive a simple correction term if there is an instrument that shifts the treatment probability to zero in special cases. Policies with eligibility restrictions, where treatment is impossible if some variable exceeds a certain value, provide a natural application. In an empirical analysis, we exploit the age eligibility restriction in the Swedish Youth Practice subsidized work program for young unemployed, where compliance is imperfect among the young. Adjusting the matching estimator for selectivity changes the results towards making subsidized work detrimental in moving individuals into employment.

In this paper we look at lifetime inequality to address two main questions: How well does a modern tax system, based on annual information, target lifetime inequality? What aspects of the tranfser system are most progressive from a lifetime perspective?

This paper looks at lifetime inequality to address two main questions: How well does a modern tax system, based on annual information, target lifetime inequality? and What aspects of the transfer system are most progressive from a lifetime perspective?

In this paper, a dynamic model is used to show how a lifecycle perspective alters our impression of the effect of the tax and benefit system on female work incentives.

This briefing note summarises a project that took a life-cycle perspective to understand how taxes and benefits affect incentives to work and earn more, and the way in which they redistribute income.