Inequality and immigration

Christian Dustmann
Yannis Kastis
Ian Preston

An IFS initiative funded by the Nuffield Foundation
Inequality and immigration

Christian Dustmann, Yannis Kastis and Ian Preston (University College London, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, CReAM)\textsuperscript{1}

Executive summary

This chapter investigates the relationship between immigration and inequality in the UK over the past 40 years. This is a period when the share of foreign-born in the UK population increased from 5.3\% in 1975 to 13.4\% in 2015. We evaluate the impact immigration had on wage inequality in the UK through two channels: the first is the effect on the earnings distribution of natives and the second is the effect on the composition of the wage-earning population. We find both effects to be very small. We decompose wage inequality into inequality within the immigrant and native groups and inequality between the two groups. We find inequality among immigrants to be consistently higher than inequality among natives. We also examine the impact of immigration on the fiscal budget, and the potentially unequal impact of the ensuing tax implications on natives. In the UK, where immigrants are net fiscal contributors, this is not a factor that aggravates economic inequality. Even though the impact of immigration is found to be small, the way it is perceived across different population groups in the UK varies; a fact mostly attributed to racial and cultural concerns rather than perceived economic competition.

1. Introduction

This chapter is concerned with the interplay between immigration and inequality. Inequality has many dimensions and may relate to earnings, income, consumption and wealth. Migration can affect inequality between countries, in origin countries and in destination countries. In this chapter, we focus on the relationship between inequality and immigration in destination countries and specifically the UK. It is in the impact that immigration may have on wages, on the composition of the workforces, and on the location of the overall distributions of earnings, in both the short run and over time, where inequality and migration naturally intersect.

A good starting point to understand the basic relationship between migration and inequality is to look at simple models such as those reviewed by Dustmann and Preston (2019). First of all, migration affects inequality between countries. In a competitive model, if individuals move across countries to where their marginal product is highest, this will lead to more efficient allocations of labour (creating a global welfare gain) and will equalise average wages across countries. Migrants themselves are the main beneficiaries, moving to where they can earn higher wages and, to the extent that those who can gain most strongly from this are in poorer parts of the world, this is inequality-reducing. Secondly, there are effects also on the wages of those who do not move. The mechanism here is through labour supply changes, which lead wages in destination regions to fall, and wages in regions where migrants come from to increase.

If we consider that labour is differentiated by skills within countries, then migration may furthermore lead to a reduction or an increase in inequality within countries, following the same mechanism. Unskilled immigration will lead to increased labour competition for unskilled workers in the destination country, leading to possibly falling wages at the low end of the income distribution, but an increase in wages further up. The opposite happens in the origin country. Thus, in this example, migration will lead to an increase in the wage gap between the lowest and highest earners in the destination country but a decrease in the origin country. Skilled migration will have opposite effects.

\textsuperscript{1} Christian Dustmann acknowledges funding from the European Research Council (ERC) Advanced Grant (MCLPS) – 833861, the DFG – grant 1024/1-2 AOBJ:642097, and the Norface Welfare State Futures programme. Yannis Kastis acknowledges funding from the Alexander S. Onassis Foundation (Scholarship ID: F ZR 023/1 - 2021/2022).
Returns to other factors of production, such as capital and land, may also change, as the arrival of additional workers makes these more productive; this also will affect inequality, depending upon where in the income distribution the owners of these other factors are found. To the extent that capital and landowners tend to be at the high end of the income distribution, this will tend to increase inequality.

There may be many additional mechanisms by which the gains from migration could be redistributed. Some of the additional earnings that those who migrate obtain may be reallocated to the origin country in terms of remittances. This may lead to an increase in earnings of the families of those who migrated if such remittances are invested productively. This in turn may affect inequality in local communities if the families of those who emigrated (who are usually not the poorest) improve their economic situation in relation to others.

The focus of this chapter is the UK, which is largely a destination country for migration. There are various ways in which immigration can affect inequality in the UK. Through the simple mechanism suggested above, immigrants may decrease the wages of those workers they compete with and increase those of workers to whom they are complements. Indeed, Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2013) find some evidence for this happening, but the effects are small. Such supply effects may be dynamic and long-lasting when immigrants initially downgrade (i.e. work in occupations with skill requirements below those that immigrants bring with them, because of, for example, a lack of complementary skills such as language proficiency), but then upgrade through additional skill acquisition to utilise their full earnings potential. Such upgrading may lead these competition effects to ripple through the earnings distribution of natives, something we investigate in ongoing work (Dustmann, Kastis and Preston, 2022). Moreover, if immigrant composition differs from that of natives, migration could affect inequality by simply changing the composition of the earnings distribution. There are not just dynamic, but also dynastic aspects of how immigration may affect inequality in the longer run. For instance, if immigrants are less mobile across generations, then this may contribute to a rise in inequality across generations.

If different groups, such as males and females or ethnic groups, differ in their skills and therefore the degree to which they are competing with immigrants, then immigration could also have an impact on inequality across groups, such as inequality across males and females or different ethnic groups. For instance, if immigration is low skilled, and a particular group (for instance, earlier immigrants) is likewise predominantly low skilled, then a simple demand–supply framework predicts that the wages of this group are likely to be more affected, in comparison to other, better-educated groups.

In this chapter, we first illustrate the history of immigration to the UK over the past 40 years, which has been characterised by a sharp increase in the share of foreign-born individuals among the UK population. While immigration to the UK was initially driven by individuals from countries outside the European Union (EU), the share of those born in the A8 countries sharply increased from 2004 onwards. One outstanding feature of immigration to the UK is that immigrants are consistently better educated than natives. Despite this, they tend to be – at least initially – located in low-paying jobs.

We next investigate the impact of immigration on inequality. There are two ways in which immigration can affect the spread of the earnings distribution in the UK: by affecting native wages directly and differently along the distribution of wages; and by changing the composition of the overall work force. Extending the work by Dustmann et al. (2013), we show that immigration slightly stretches the native earnings distribution by putting downward pressure on native wages at the bottom and benefiting native wages at the top. Moreover, we decompose overall wage inequality in the UK into wage inequality within the immigrant and native groups and inequality between the two groups. Investigating wage distributions for the two groups in isolation, we find that wage inequality among immigrants has been consistently higher than among natives. Consequently, inequality in the population as a whole including immigrants is

---

2 A8 countries are those countries that joined the EU in May 2004, and comprise the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. These are grouped separately from the other two countries that joined the EU in 2004 (Cyprus and Malta), mainly because of their relatively similar geographical location in mainland Europe.
slightly higher than in the population of natives alone. However, this, as with any other effect of immigration on inequality, is very small.

The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2, we show how the presence of immigrants in the UK changed during these last 40 years. In Section 3, we discuss the economic performance of these immigrants. In Section 4, we present estimates of the effects of immigration along the native wage distribution in the UK. In Section 5, we discuss how immigration can affect wage inequality in the destination country and we decompose overall wage inequality into wage inequality within the immigrant group and within the native group. We also document the way wage inequality evolved within these two groups throughout the period of our study. In Section 6, we discuss how immigration can affect inequality through its fiscal impact and we explore how different population groups form attitudes about immigration, based on economic consideration and cultural concern. We summarise our findings and conclude in Section 7.

2. Background

Immigration to the UK

We start this section by defining how we interpret the terms ‘migration’ and ‘migrant’. The Oxford English Dictionary’s first definition of ‘migration’ is the ‘movement of a person or people from one country, locality, place of residence, etc. to settle in another’. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) defines ‘migrant’ as ‘an umbrella term, not defined under international law, reflecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons’. For our purposes, these are definitions that we follow in this chapter. When presenting evidence in what follows about the UK, we define an individual as an ‘immigrant’ if they are settled in the UK but were born in a country other than the UK, and as an ‘emigrant’ if they were born in the UK but have emigrated to another country. Not all data sources report country of birth, and we discuss other possible definitions, focused less on place of birth.

Following this definition, we show in Figure 1(a) how the share of immigrants in the UK population has evolved over the past 45 years, based on data from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). We distinguish between foreign-born of all ages as a share of the overall UK population (dotted line), and foreign-born in the age range between 18 and 60 as a share of the UK population in the same age range (solid line). The graphs illustrate a substantial increase in the share of immigrants within the UK population, in particular over the past 20 years. While the share of immigrants of all ages over the UK population rises only by 1.6 percentage points between 1975 and 1995 (from 5.3% to 6.7%), it increases to 13.4% by 2015. The share of immigrants within the age range 18–60 follows the same trend but is consistently higher throughout this period, reflecting a higher concentration of immigrants in the working-age population.

Figure 1(b) distinguishes the percentage shares of immigrants in the UK population by age groups. The increase in the share of immigrants is most remarkable since 2000 in the age groups 26–35 and 36–45, which rose from 8% in 1975 to about 23% and 25% in 2019, respectively.

---

3 The LFS is a sample survey of households living at private addresses. It includes only individuals who have been residents at the sample address for more than six consecutive months. As a result, foreign-born individuals who have been in the UK for fewer than six months are under-represented in the survey. (Source: Office for National Statistics, Social and Vital Statistics Division, Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Central Survey Unit, Quarterly Labour Force Survey, 1993–2016; Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, Social Survey Division, Labour Force Survey, 1975–1991.)

4 The LFS considers every individual from a sample household aged 16 and over. Foreign-born individuals who arrived in the UK as children and are aged 16 or over at the time of the interview are also included. We consider the age range 18–60 to measure immigrant concentration in the working-age population.
**Figure 1. Immigrants as percentage shares: (a) of the UK population; (b) of the UK population by age groups**

(a)

(b)

Note: In panel (a), the dash-dotted line illustrates the evolution of the share of immigrants of all ages over the overall UK population for the period 1975-2019. The solid line shows the evolution of the share of immigrants aged 18-60 over the UK population in the same age range for the same period. Panel (b) illustrates the evolution of immigrant shares across five age groups over the UK population for the period 1975-2019. We define as immigrants all foreign-born individuals.

Source: UK LFS.
The UK experienced not just a large increase in the share of immigrants, but also a pronounced change in their origin. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which displays the shares of immigrants in the age group 18–60, distinguishing between countries that joined the EU before 2004, former Eastern and Central European countries that joined the EU in 2004 or later, Commonwealth countries, and the rest of the world.\(^5\) The figure clearly shows that those born in countries of the Commonwealth still constitute the largest share among immigrants in the UK, although their share has declined over the past 20 years. Immigrants born in countries that joined the EU before 2004 accounted for about 35% of the immigrant population in 1975, but their share decreased to 15% in 2015. However, as a result of EU enlargement, the share of immigrants coming from countries that joined the EU in 2004 or later dramatically increased from less than 5% in 2005 to more than 20% in 2015. Finally, the share of those born in countries included in the ‘rest of the world’ group also substantially increased over the past 40 years.

**Figure 2. Immigrants as percentage shares by country of birth**

![Graph showing percentage shares of immigrants by country of birth](image)

Note: The figure shows the percentage shares of immigrants from four groups of countries of birth within the immigrant population aged 18–60 in the UK. The first group includes individuals born in a Commonwealth country. The second group consists of those born in countries that joined the EU before 2004, while the third group includes those born in countries that joined the EU in 2004 or later. The fourth group includes all other foreign-born individuals.

Source: UK LFS.

It should be noted that the definition of a migrant adopted here is not the only way immigrants can be defined. As noted earlier, official statistics in many countries do not record country of birth but citizenship, which is then used to define immigrant populations. Even some UK statistics use this definition. For instance, in their statistics about the flows of immigrants into the UK, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) Long-Term International Migration (LTIM) estimates (ONS, 2020), which we also present in Figures 4, 5 and 6, use ‘citizenship’ rather than ‘country of birth’ as a definition of who is an immigrant.\(^6\) In Figure 3, we compare the two definitions, using the LFS dataset, for EU and non-EU born individuals (left panel) and EU and non-EU nationals (right panel).

\(^5\) There are 53 Commonwealth countries. The most populated are India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Malaysia, South Africa, Cameroon, Mozambique, Rwanda, Canada and Australia. Cyprus and Malta are included in the Commonwealth and not in the countries that joined the EU in 2004 or later. Countries that joined the EU in 2004 or later include the A8 countries together with Bulgaria and Romania (A2 countries), which joined the EU in 2007.

\(^6\) Another difference between the definitions of a migrant in the LTIM and the LFS is that the LTIM consider only foreign nationals who enter the UK and intend to stay for at least a year, while the LFS includes foreign-born individuals who have been in the UK for more than six months.
for the period between 1994 and 2016. The figure illustrates that the two definitions lead to starkly different assessments about immigration, with the latter being much lower than the former for non-EU immigrants, but not for EU immigrants. The difference is a result of naturalisation of many of those who are born outside the UK, in particular from non-EU countries. In the same figure, we observe that although the stock of non-EU born kept rising after 2009, the stock of non-EU nationals remained rather constant. In line with these graphs, data from the Home Office Immigration Statistics, which can be found in Table A.4 in the Appendix, report that nearly 950,000 UK citizenships were granted between 2009 and 2016 to individuals who were previously non-EU nationals, which largely explains the difference between the left and right panels in the figure. As a result, the difference between these two definitions is driven mainly by non-EU immigrants who have a high naturalisation rate.

**Figure 3. Immigrant stocks by country of birth and nationality in the UK**

![Figure 3. Immigrant stocks by country of birth and nationality in the UK](image)

Note: The graph on the left illustrates the evolutions of the stocks (in thousands) of EU and non-EU born individuals aged 18 or over in the UK. The graph on the right illustrates the evolutions of the stocks (in thousands) for EU nationals and non-EU nationals aged 18 or over. The stocks are estimated for each quarter from the first quarter of 1994 to the last quarter of 2016. The vertical line shows as reference the first quarter of 2009.

Source: UK LFS.

Net migration flows of non-EU nationals to the UK have been consistently higher than the net flows of EU nationals. This is shown in Figure 4 for the period 2004–19. This figure also shows that net immigration from the EU decreased sharply after the Brexit referendum in 2016, from 184,000 in 2015 to 50,000 in 2019, while net inflows of non-EU nationals increased from 189,000 in 2015 to 323,000 in 2019.

---

7 The Home Office Immigration Statistics do not provide information on citizenships granted by country of birth. We assume here that the number of individuals of previous nationality outside the EU is a good approximation for the number of individuals born outside the EU without being UK nationals.

8 Note that nationality rather than country of birth is recorded in the LTIM estimates, on which these numbers are based. The LTIM is a survey conducted at entry, so that foreign nationality and foreign born should not deviate much.
Figure 4. Net migration flows to the UK


Temporary and permanent migrations

An important aspect of a migration is its permanency. The distinction between permanent and temporary migrants is of key importance if one is to assess performance and incentives of immigrants to integrate into the economy and society of the destination country, both economically as well as socially, as explained in Dustmann and Görlach (2016b) and Adda, Dustmann and Görlach (2022) and discussed in Section 4. The permanence of migration also has important consequences for the fiscal contribution immigrants make over their life cycle to the destination country (see Dustmann et al., 2022).

We define here a ‘permanent migration’ as a migration that lasts until the respective individual’s exit from the workforce due to old age (‘retirement’). A ‘temporary migration’ is accordingly a migration that ends before an individual leaves the labour force. Accordingly, we define a migrant as a ‘temporary migrant’ if his/her duration in the destination country is temporary according to the above definition. While the early literature on immigration considered migrations as predominantly permanent, it is increasingly understood that permanent migrations may be the exception rather than the rule. Dustmann and Görlach (2016a) illustrate outmigration rates of immigrants from their destination countries, distinguishing between European countries and Anglo-America, Australia and New Zealand. Not only are these outmigration rates high, but they are also far higher for the first than the second set of countries, illustrating interesting variation across destination countries for the degree to which immigrations are temporary. Outmigration may affect inequality by the same channels as immigration that we discussed above, through effects on wages, and through compositional changes.
For the UK, in Figure 5, we display the share of individuals from an arrival cohort who are still in the UK up to 10 years after arrival. To construct these figures, we use a methodology explained in Dustmann and Weiss (2007). The data stem from the International Passenger Survey Long-Term International Migration (IPS-LTIM) estimates and we focus on individuals who arrived in the UK between 2005 and 2015. The figure shows that a substantial share of immigrants leave the UK within the first five years after arrival. More specifically, nearly 25% of non-EU nationals had left the UK five years after their arrival, with this share barely changing over the next five years, while such outmigration after the first five years was, at 40%, substantially higher for EU nationals. There are slight differences between EU14 countries and A8 countries, with 45% of EU14 nationals having left the UK five years after their arrival, while over the same period 35% of those from A8 countries have left.

**Figure 5. Survival rates of immigrants in the UK by citizenship**

Note: The figure reports estimated survival rates of immigrants in the UK by passport-reported citizenship. Long-term immigrants are defined as those who live for more than 12 months away from their usual residence. We focus on flows of immigrants who arrived between 2005 and 2015 and left between 2006 and 2016.

Source: IPS-LTIM.

**Causes of migration**

Migrations have many different causes. Economists commonly focus attention on the economic aspects of migration decisions, based on individuals’ assessment of the economic benefits of remaining in the region or country of current residence or origin, and migrating to an alternative region where economic conditions are more favourable.

A simple intertemporal model for migration might pay attention to the economic gain from migration $K$, expressed as

---

9 Dustmann and Weiss use the LFS data from the period 1992–2002. Here we use the IPS data for the period 2005–16 and compute these survival rates for non-UK citizens. The IPS data are collected on entry of foreign nationals in the UK and provide information on the number of these nationals that leave the UK in each of the following years. Estimates of outmigration rates computed from the IPS data are similar to estimates based on the LFS.
where $y_{kt}$ are the income flows in the origin ($k = E$) and destination ($k = I$) country, $r$ is the discount rate, and $C$ are the costs of migration. These costs can include both monetary costs (such as migration costs, preparatory costs, etc.) and also social and emotional costs (such as loss of contact with family, costs of cultural change, etc., expressed in monetary equivalents). The migration decision is taken in base period $0$, and the productive life of an individual lasts $T$ periods. If $K > 0$, a migration will take place.

This simple model emphasises that migrations are not based on current differences in economic opportunity between two regions, but on the discounted current values of incomes in the two alternative locations. The intertemporal nature of migration decisions explains why migrations may not take place even if current economic advantages are large, or why they do take place despite very small current wage advantages.

The model in equation (1) can (and has been) extended in many directions. Migration costs may contain a dynamic element, where future considerations (e.g., opportunities for children, etc.) play an important role. One could further consider uncertainty about future earnings (Bellemare, 2007), introduce a utility function that allows for non-monetary preferences in origin or destination regions (Piyapromdee, 2020), or add differences in purchasing power in origin and destination regions (Kirdar, 2013), etc. Complex models such as Adda et al. (2022) allow in addition for investment into different forms of human capital and non-permanent migrations.

While economic migrations are what economists commonly investigate and model, migrations may also have non-economic reasons. One important such reason is family re-unification. While, initially, migrants tend to be male, it is usually the case that the first wave of economic migration is followed by re-unification, which is when there is a tendency for wives and children to move to join them in the destination country. More particularly, 56% of non-EU family re-unified immigrants who entered the UK in 2018 were women who followed their husbands and 11% were children (Home Office Immigration Statistics). These migrations are considerable in magnitude, even though the share of the migrant population in the UK they explain has decreased since the 1990s. Among those who moved to the UK between 2016 and 2018, the share of those who declared that the reason for their migration was to accompany or join a family member was estimated to be 12% (ONS, 2020, table 2).

In Figures 6(a) and (b), we use the ONS LTIM estimates for the period 2010–19 to plot the evolution of inflows to the UK of EU and non-EU nationals by reported reasons of migration. Inflows for work-related or family reunification reasons have been more common among EU nationals in comparison to inflows for study. In contrast, as we see in Figure 6(b), inflows of non-EU nationals have been largely driven by those who wish to study. Inflows of EU nationals for work-related or family reunification purposes between 2015 (i.e., the year before the Brexit referendum) and 2019 decreased by 109,000 individuals (i.e., by 56%). EU inflows for study reasons up until 2019 remained largely stable.

10 Home Office Immigration Statistics, year ending June 2019, Admission Table ad_03_f. The information presented here is based on data on permits to enter the UK granted to family reunification migrants. Such permits are only available for non-EU nationals, as EU nationals have a right to move to the UK due to free mobility.
Figure 6. EU (a) and non-EU (b) inflows by reason for migration

(a)

In thousands

EU referendum


0 50 100 150 200 250

Work and Family reunification
Study

(b)

In thousands

EU referendum


0 50 100 150 200 250

Work and Family reunification
Study

Note: The figure illustrates inflows of EU and non-EU nationals for work and family reasons versus study in the UK.
Source: ONS (2020, table 3).
Another important form of migration is flight from adverse conditions in the country or region of origin due to persecution, war or natural disaster; see Dustmann et al. (2017) and Fasani, Frattini and Minale (2022) for discussion and Brell, Dustmann and Preston (2020) for analysis of refugees’ economic assimilation. The status of refugees is grounded in Article 14 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognises the right of persons to seek asylum from persecution in other countries, and which has its origins dating back to the aftermath of World War II and the refugee crises of the preceding inter-war years. The United Nations Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (GCR) was adopted in 1951. Most countries are signatories of the GCR, committing them to provide protection for individuals who leave their country of origin due to personal persecution.

As illustrated in Figure 7, asylum-related grants of settlement in the UK were comparatively high in the early 2000s but dropped significantly afterwards. According to Home Office Immigration Statistics, the total number of asylum-related grants of settlement in the UK reached 10,747 in the first quarter of 2001, but only 1,088 in the third quarter of 2020. Note that however prominent refugee migration might be in popular discussion, these numbers are consistently very low compared with other forms of migration. The higher number of granted asylum claims in the early years of the 2000s reflected the rise in asylum applications worldwide as well as in the UK during the late 1990s and the early 2000s (Hatton, 2009). The Immigration and Asylum Acts of 1999 and 2002 established stricter border controls, speeded up the examination of asylum applications and increased the number of the criteria needed to positively decide asylum claims, which led to the sharp decrease in asylum-related grants in the UK after the early 2000s.

Figure 7. Total asylum-related grants in the UK

Note: The figure illustrates the evolution of the number of asylum-related grants in the UK from the first quarter of 2001 to the third quarter of 2020.

Source: Home Office Immigration Statistics, Tables Asy_D01

11 In its first article, the GCR defines a refugee as: ‘[any person who] owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’ Being based on the concept of individual persecution, the GCR definition of refugees does not specifically address the more general issue of civilians fleeing wars and conflicts. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), however, considers that persons fleeing civil wars and ethnic, tribal and religious violence and whose country of origin is unwilling or unable to protect them should be considered refugees even if they are fleeing a general rather than an individual threat.

12 ‘Asylum-related grants of settlement’ is the term used in official statistics to define successful asylum applications.
Immigration to the UK in an international context

Figure 1(a) shows that the share of immigrants in the UK increased from 5.3% in 1975 to 13.4% in 2015. This increase is in line with a global rise in international migrants. The total number of international migrants increased from about 161 million people in 1995 (2.8% of the world population) to almost 272 million (or 3.5% of the world population) in 2019. In Europe, Northern America, Australia/New Zealand and Japan alone, the share of immigrants increased from 7.9% of the population (92 million) to 12% (or more than 150 million) in 2019 (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, International Migrant Stock 2019).13 Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows that the share of immigrants in the UK population is quite modest in comparison to countries such as Australia and Switzerland. The figure also illustrates that the share of immigrants has increased substantially across all countries depicted, and for some countries considerably so.

Obviously, all these figures illustrate that international migration has increased considerably in magnitude, and that such is the case among all developed countries. Why have we seen migration increase so substantially?

Economic reasons are likely to play a major role. After World War II, migration to the UK started as a result of an excess demand for lower-skilled labour, fuelled by the expanding industrial production of Europe’s manufacturing sectors. In the case of the UK, immigrants in the post-war years were first drawn from Europe and then increasingly from former colonies and subsequently Commonwealth countries – the arrival of the Windrush in 1948 with former Caribbean service men is often seen as a symbol of these early labour migrations though immigration from India, Pakistan and later East Africa was also substantial. This movement slowed down considerably in the early 1970s, after the first oil crisis, which brought an end to the rapid expansion of Europe’s manufacturing industries, and as increasingly restrictive immigration legislation was introduced.

As Figure 1(a) shows, the share of immigrants grew only slightly from the mid-1970s until the mid-1990s. The early 2000s saw a repeat of economically driven immigration. Over the period between 1997 up to the Great Recession, the UK economy grew at a considerable pace (at around 3% in real terms) and experienced a lack of qualified tradesmen and service workers in sectors such as health, care and hospitality, among others. More specifically, employment in the public sector expanded by 19% between 1994 and 2010, while immigration accounted for 29% of this growth (Dustmann and Frattini, 2011). On average, foreign-born public employees made up 10% of the healthcare sector over the period 1994–96, and this share rises to 14.1% in the years 2008–10. When, in 2004, eight Central and Eastern European countries joined the EU, the UK (together with Ireland and Sweden) waived the seven-year transition period over which old EU member states could deny access to citizens of new member states to their labour markets (Article 24, Part Four, Act of Accession 2003).14 This triggered a substantial immigration, as illustrated in Figure 2, predominantly from Poland and the remaining seven countries in the A8 group that joined the EU in 2004. Immigrants arriving from the A8 countries were young and predominantly well educated. While this addressed the scarcity of labour in many sectors, it was also seen by many as a concern and was associated with a rise in anti-immigration sentiment, in particular towards EU immigration. As a result, when Bulgaria and Romania (A2 countries) joined the EU in 2007, the UK imposed restrictions to limit migration of nationals from these countries only to students and to self-employed, highly skilled, and food and agricultural workers.

While the increase in immigration was often blamed on the EU’s statue of free movement of labour, it is interesting to observe in Figure 4 that net migration into the UK has been consistently higher (and above the target of 100,000) from non-EU countries than from EU countries since

---

13 The share of the foreign-born population in the US rose from 4.7% in 1970 to 13.5% in 2015 (Migration Policy Institute). In Europe, the population share of migrants in Germany increased from 7.5% in 1990 to 14.3% in 2015, while the share of migrants in the Spanish population drastically increased from 2.1% to 12.7% during the same period. The share of migrant population also rose in France from 10.4% to 12.1% (World Bank Development Indicators).

14 In the Accession Treaty of 2003, the old member states can impose a transition period for up to seven years, restricting workers coming from countries joining the EU from being employed on equal and non-discriminatory terms in their labour markets. Such transitional arrangements could be imposed for two years initially, and extensions needed to be decided for another three years. The period could then be extended for another two years.
the early 2000s, even though non-EU immigration is in principle controllable by the UK government. Some suggest that this indicated that the need for workers remained an important factor for immigration into the UK throughout the period.

Refugee migration is driven largely by political circumstances in origin countries and acceptance of refugees can be seen as the UK fulfilling its obligations under the GCR. We commented in the previous section on the rise in the asylum-related grants of settlement in the UK towards the end of the 1990s and early 2000s. According to the GCR, the UK is obliged to examine applications for asylum from displaced people who reach the country’s soil. In particular, from the early 2000s onwards, the UK has implemented stricter border controls, stronger penalties on migrant smugglers and faster and more efficient examination of asylum applications to reduce the inflow of undocumented migrants. Moreover, financial support of asylum-seekers waiting for a decision on their application has been reduced, which is seen by some as a tool to discourage refugee migration.

**Immigrant selection**

Despite the first immigrants to the UK being predominantly targeted towards lower-skilled jobs, immigrants to the UK over the past 40 years have been consistently better educated than the native workforce. This can be seen from Figure 8, which illustrates the share of college-educated immigrants versus native born (left panel) and the difference between average years of full-time education (right panel) of immigrants versus natives, since 1981. In the earlier two decades, this educational advantage was partly due to the low education level of the UK labour force – for example, in 1981, although only 10% of foreign-born individuals aged between 18 and 60 years old were college educated, the corresponding share was less than 10% for UK-born workers. Educational attainments of the native-born workforce increased substantially (e.g., in 2019, more than 30% of the UK native-born workforce held a college degree or tertiary qualifications), but so did the educational attainment of immigrants to the UK, with the share of those with college education being higher than 40% in 2019. The same educational gap in favour of immigrants is reflected in the right-hand panel of Figure 8. The average years that immigrants spend in full-time education are consistently higher than the average years that natives spend throughout the 40 years of this study.

The UK stands out internationally for its very well-educated immigrant population. Figure A.2 in the Appendix compares educational attainments measured as the share of tertiary-educated across different industrialised countries. Remarkably, the share of tertiary-educated immigrants in the UK is (at 49.8%) almost the same as in Australia, which runs a highly selective and education-based immigration policy.

Economists have been long interested in what determines the selection of immigrants in terms of their skills. The simple economic model in equation (1) suggests that immigrants migrate to countries where the price they obtain for their skills is highest. Borjas (1987) was the first to formalise this idea based on the Roy model, which goes back to a paper by Roy (1951). In that paper, Roy develops the implications of multi-dimensional abilities for occupational choice, the structure of wages, and earnings distributions. The model was later formalised in a number of papers (see, e.g., Willis and Rosen, 1979; Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985; Willis, 1986). We briefly develop the key idea of the Roy model and refer the reader to Dustmann and Glitz (2011) for more detail. Let us express the log of earnings $Y_{ij}$, of individual i in country j as a linear function of $\mu_j$, the rental rate of human capital, and the stock of human capital, which is the linear combination of price weighted skills $b_1 S_1$ and $b_2 S_2$, where skill prices $b_1$ and $b_2$ are country-specific:

$$y_{ij} = \ln Y_{ij} = \mu_j + b_1 S_{1i} + b_2 S_{2i}. \quad (2)$$

Equation (2) allows for two-dimensionality of skills (i.e., cognitive and creative skills), which of course can be easily extended to multiple dimensions. The skill-price weighted sum of skills, $b_1 S_1 + b_2 S_2$, is often referred to as ‘human capital’ (see Dustmann, Fadlon and Weiss, 2011). With this definition, migration from a country with low skill prices to a country with higher skill prices can be considered as an investment in human capital.

Facing the choice between two countries (i.e., the country of origin, and a possible destination country), the migrant will decide on the country where earnings will be highest, which will depend on the rent on human capital $\mu_i$ as well as on skill prices $b_i$. 

Let $\mu_I - \mu_E = \mu$. Then, the decision to migrate will be based on comparison of earnings in the destination and origin countries, and a migration will take place if $(b_I - b_E) S_i + (b_I - b_E) S_j^2 + \mu > 0$.

Assume, for the moment, that $\mu = 0$. It may well be that prices for skill 1 are higher in the destination country $(b_I - b_E) > 0$, but those for skill 2 are higher in the country of origin $(b_I - b_E) < 0$. In such a case, those with high $S_1$ (relative to $S_2$) will be more likely to emigrate, while those with high $S_2$ (relative to $S_1$) will be more likely to remain in the country of origin. It is obvious that, in such a case, no ranking of immigrants is possible; whether someone is a migrant depends on the relative prices of skills in the two countries, which in turn depend on the industry structures and the relative scarcity of skills in the two economies.

Consider, now, the case where skills are one-dimensional, which is the type of Roy model most migration economists have used. This would, for example, be the case if skill 1 had no value in either country, so that the migration choice would reduce to $(b_I - b_E) S_i + \mu > 0$. In this case, migration will take place if the first term is larger than the second term. Suppose now that $\mu < 0$, but $b_I > b_E$. In this case, individuals with low skills $S_2$ may find it disadvantageous to emigrate, because of the lower rent on human capital abroad, but those with high skills gain through migration. Thus, this implies that those who migrate possess more of skill 2 than those who remain in the country of origin – so that migration is positively selective. Of course, the opposite is the case when $\mu > 0$, but $b_I < b_E$. Thus, with one-dimensional skills, this model predicts that immigration will be either positively or negatively selective. Given the assumptions we have made about the distribution of skills $S$, a positive selective migration would imply that $\text{Var}(y_I) = b_I^2 > \text{Var}(Y_E) = b_E^2$, so that the variance of earnings is higher in the destination country.
This insight is the basis for many empirical papers that seek to investigate the selectivity of migration, starting with the original work of Borjas (1987). Chicquiar and Hanson (2005), Ibarra-ran and Lubotsky (2007), Moraga (2011) and Kaestner and Malamud (2014) have studied the selectivity of Mexican migration to the United States, while Ramos (1992) explored selection of Puerto Rican immigrants moving to the United States. Abramitzky, Bousani and Erikkson (2012) reached findings that were partly consistent with the Roy/Borjas model when investigating migration from Norway to the United States during the Age of Mass Migration. It should be noted that unambiguous statements about selection of immigrants are only possible under very restrictive assumptions about skill structures, in particular the assumption that there is only one dimension of skills.

We illustrate the pattern of selection in Figure 9. Consider, first, Figure 9(a). The top panel illustrates the distribution of earnings in the destination (upper graph) and the origin (lower graph), while the bottom panel shows the relation between skills and wages in the origin and destination countries. Figure 9(a) relates to the case where there is one dimension of skills only (i.e., $S_1$), and where the rental rate on human capital $\mu$ is the same in both countries. The way the figure is drawn, the price for skills is higher in the destination country, so that $b_I > b_E$, which implies that $\text{Var}(y_I) > \text{Var}(y_E)$. It follows (assuming zero migration costs) that for all individuals in the origin country whose skills are larger than the mean of $S_1$, it is worthwhile migrating, which we have normalised to be zero. The graph in the bottom panel illustrates this – the wage gap between destination and origin becomes larger, the larger the level of skills. With this scenario, those who emigrate have higher than average earnings in both countries, while those who do not emigrate have lower (potential) earnings in both countries, but higher earnings in the origin country than in the destination country. Thus, this scenario leads to positively selective migration. Following Borjas (1987), a number of subsequent papers have investigated the selectivity of migration, testing the hypothesis that migration is positively selective if the variance of earnings is higher in the destination country – or, more generally, if the variance in the destination is large relative to the covariance, and the variance in the origin country is small, relative to covariance.

So far, we have assumed that $\mu_I = \mu_E$. If the rental rate on human capital is higher in the destination $\mu_I > \mu_E$ (which could be due to, for example, superior production technologies), the upper graph in the top panel of Figure 9(a) will shift to the right, and migration will be worthwhile for a larger part of the population in the origin country, which will reduce the degree of selection. Even if $b_I = b_E$ (the price for skills is the same in the two countries), a higher rental rate on human capital will lead to migration if $\mu_I > \mu_E$. In the extreme where $b_I = b_E$, migration will be equally worthwhile for individuals along the entire distribution of skills, and there will be no selection. This situation corresponds to the two lines in the graph of the bottom panel running parallel, with the one for the destination country being above the one for the origin country.

Figure 9(b) illustrates the opposite situation, where the price for skills is higher in the origin country, which leads to negatively selective migration.

An interesting third case occurs if skill prices are such that the same combination of skills would place an individual high up in the earnings hierarchy in one country, but low down in the other. Willis (1986) refers to this as ‘non-hierarchical sorting’: unlike the two cases above, it is no longer possible to sort individuals according to their skills in a way that is consistent across countries. Borjas (1987) has referred to this case as ‘refugee sorting’, a reference that was probably motivated by refugee migrations at the time being characterised by highly educated individuals fleeing dictatorial regimes that saw educated citizens as a threat. More generally, this case is interesting when considering economies that specialise in particular sectors (which require particularly talented and educated workers) in a global economy where trade allows such specialisation (see Dustmann and Glitz, 2011, for a discussion).
Figure 9. From left to right, positively selective immigration, negatively selective immigration, and immigration under 'non-hierarchical sorting'

Note: The figures illustrate three cases of selectivity of immigration in a simple Roy model with only one dimension of skills. The top panels illustrate the distributions of earnings in the destination country (upper graphs) and the origin country (lower graphs). The bottom panels show the relation between skills and wages in the destination and origin countries.

One can think of this arising most naturally with multiple skills where skill 1 is only valuable in the origin country, while skill 2 has value only in the destination country. In that case, and again making the assumption that $\mu_I = \mu_E$, the earnings of those who decide to migrate are higher than the average earnings in the destination country, but they are lower than the average earnings in the origin country. Moreover, the earnings of those who do not migrate would be lower than mean earnings in the destination country had they migrated, but higher than average earnings in the country of origin. Those who migrate have a below-average productive capacity in their origin country, but an above-average productive capacity in the destination country. Alternatively, one could imagine a case with a single dimension of skills, which is positively rewarded in one country but negatively rewarded in the other, as illustrated in Figure 9(c).

The different scenarios have implications for earnings inequality in the destination country as well as the country of origin. For instance, the first scenario, where skill prices are higher in the destination country, would remove mass from the earnings distribution in the origin country and add mass to the upper tail of the earnings distribution in the destination country. Within-country wage inequality would thus be reduced in the origin country, but increased in the destination country; moreover, between-country wage inequality would be enhanced, as mean wages will increase in the destination country, but decrease in the origin country.

It is interesting to look at the case where we consider two skills, with one being more valuable in the destination country, while the other is more valuable in the country of origin. In this case, migration will lead to a better allocation of skills in both countries, thus increasing mean earnings in both origin and destination countries. Moreover, inequality in the origin country will be reduced, as those at the low end of the skill distribution will be removed, and possibly increase in the destination country as we add mass to the top of the distribution.

Our considerations above have excluded migrations from what we call the destination country to the origin country; however, such movements are certainly possible as well, with the overall implications being quite obvious from the above considerations. Moreover, we have assumed that skill prices are constant. This is unlikely to be the case – skill prices will be determined by supply and demand and the production technologies, so that, for example, removing high-skilled workers in scenario 1 above from the origin country will increase the price for skills in that country, while it will decrease the price for skills in the destination, with implied consequences for inequality.
3. Economic performance of immigrants

Downgrading

We have shown above that immigrants in the UK are remarkably well educated, which would place them very much higher up the distribution of earnings. However, skills as usually measured in terms of full-time education or labour market experience that are acquired in the origin country are not perfectly transferable, at least initially. Moreover, immigrants upon arrival may not possess complementary skills that allow them to make their existing skills productive in the destination country’s labour market. One such skill is language proficiency – a skilled surgeon is unlikely to be allowed to practise if he or she does not speak the English language.

All these lead immigrants to ‘downgrade’ relative to where we would assign them in the distribution of earnings based on their measured skills. Such downgrading is likely to be more severe in countries where immigrants are well educated, such as the UK. Thus, despite their considerably higher educational attainment, immigrants to the UK tend to substantially downgrade upon arrival, working in jobs that are in far lower earnings categories than where they would be allocated based on their education alone.

We illustrate this in Figure 10, where we follow Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2013) to display the density of newly arrived immigrants in the UK (arrival within the past two years). The dashed line allocates them according to where they would be situated in the native earnings distribution if the return to their observable skills (education and age) equalled that of natives.¹⁵ Not surprisingly, and in accordance with the high level of education that we illustrate above, immigrants can be found predominantly in the higher percentiles of the native earnings distribution. This, however, contrasts dramatically with where they are situated, as indicated by the dotted line, which shows that the density of newly arrived immigrants is far higher than that of natives at the lower parts of the distribution. This downgrading is a common feature of migrations (see evidence for Germany and the US in Dustmann, Schönberg and Stuhler, 2016), although it is more extreme in countries where immigrant populations are highly skilled.

It is likely that initial downgrading is followed by subsequent upgrading as immigrants acquire complementary skills and transfer their existing skill sets to the particularities of the destination country. This is precisely what is illustrated in Figure 11, where we show the position of immigrants in the native earnings distribution, distinguishing groups with varying durations in the UK. The figure shows that indeed immigrants upgrade, with the densities of those with 14–16 years of duration being now more similar to where allocation according to observable skills would put them in the distribution.

It is clear from Figures 10 and 11 that the degree of initial downgrading, as well as upgrading in subsequent years, has an impact on the distribution of earnings of immigrants, and – through dynamic effects on skill prices and composition – on the earnings inequality of natives. We address this issue below and investigate the dynamic implications in another paper (see Dustmann, Kastis and Preston, 2022).

Moreover, Figure 11 is based on cross-sectional data. One reason for what we interpret as upgrading may be compositional changes as immigrants out-migrate, something illustrated in Figure 5. It should be noted that – if considering inequality in earnings and how it is related to immigration – this is part of the dynamics that determines the distribution of earnings in the UK. However, it is of interest to understand to what extent compositional changes through selective outmigration may indeed be responsible for the dynamics illustrated in Figure 11. In Figure A.3 in the Appendix, we display the predicted position of immigrants in the native wage distribution, assuming that returns to education are equal to those of natives and distinguishing between the same arrival cohorts as in Figure 11. The predicted densities are closely aligned, suggesting that selection based on education is not the driving force behind the upgrading profiles in Figure 11.

¹⁵ We measure earnings as hourly wages deflated at 2015 prices (conditional on employment) and we trim the bottom and top 1% of the sample to exclude outliers.
Figure 10. Predicted and actual positions of recent immigrants on the native wage distribution

Note: The figure shows kernel estimates of the density (dot-dashed line) and the predicted density (dashed line) of immigrants who arrived within the last two years in the non-immigrant wage distribution. The horizontal line shows as reference the non-immigrant wage distribution. The kernel estimates are above the horizontal line at wages where immigrants are more concentrated than natives and below the horizontal line at wages where immigrants are less concentrated than natives. Hourly wages are deflated at 2015 prices (conditional on employment) and we trim the bottom and top 1% of the sample to exclude outliers.


Economic integration
Upgrading requires immigrants to accumulate new skills and to transform existing skills so that they are productive in the destination country. To what extent such investment takes place depends on whether immigrants have an incentive to invest into human capital in the destination country, and by how much. The incentive to invest into new skills that are specific to the destination country's labour market depends – among other things – on the perceived future duration of the immigrant in the destination country. This is where the distinction between permanent and temporary migration becomes important. If large parts of skills are specific to the destination country (e.g., if the language of the destination country has little value in other countries), then the pay-off period of any investment becomes an important factor that affects the investment decision. For instance, two identical immigrants aged 20, one with the intention to remain for five years in the destination country, the other with the intention to remain permanently, will have very different incentives for investment into skills that are of low value outside the destination country. Thus, transferability of skills, and the degree to which migrations are temporary, will play an important role in explaining the career paths of immigrants in the destination country.
The performance of immigrants in the destination country has been of intense interest to economists, and there is a large body of literature concerned with the estimation of immigrants’ earnings profiles (see Dustmann and Görlach, 2015, for a survey). Chiswick (1978) was the first to investigate this, using the 1970 US census to assess immigrants’ earnings paths in comparison with those to natives. Chiswick’s main findings are that immigrants upon arrival to the US have an earnings disadvantage of about 17%; however, after about 10–15 years in the US labour market, their earnings overtake those of native workers. Chiswick explains this by suggesting that immigrants have ‘more innate ability, are more highly motivated towards labour market success, or self-finance larger investments in post-school training’. In a subsequent paper, Borjas (1985) shows that estimation based on cross-sectional data may lead to misleading conclusions, because immigrants who differ in their years of residence in the destination country have also arrived at different points in time. Thus, if immigrant entry wages change over time, then Chiswick’s cross-sectional study may confound differences in immigrant cohort quality with assimilation. Borjas provides convincing evidence that this is indeed the case for the US. Dustmann, Ku and Surovtseva (2021) show that the decline in entry wages of immigrant cohorts in the US over the period Borjas considers may be a result not only of a decline in skills, but also of the exchange rates of immigrants coming from countries where the US dollar has high purchasing power; this leads to immigrants having low reservation wages upon entry, resulting in lower wages.

Adda et al. (2022) point out that not only may changes in entry wages across cohorts lead to misleading conclusions about immigrants’ career paths, but selective outmigration may likewise lead to mis-assessment of the steepness of their career profiles. If outmigration is selective, in the sense that the most-skilled (least-skilled) immigrants leave the country first, then this will lead to a downward (upward) bias in estimated earnings profiles for the original arrival cohort. Longitudinal data allow this issue to be addressed but require – in the most general case – the researcher to model the process of outmigration alongside the career profiles of immigrants, similar to a simple attrition model (see Dustmann and Görlach, 2015). When imposing the additional assumption that the selection of leavers depends on time-constant and unobserved
characteristics, data that follow surviving immigrants backwards are sufficient to address this issue (see Lubotsky, 2007).

It is, however, unclear whether the researcher should be interested in the counterfactual earnings profile of immigrants if outmigration had not happened. If, for instance, the focus of interest is on the contribution immigrants make to the destination country in terms of taxes, or how they affect earnings inequality, all that matters are the earnings of those immigrants who remain, and who are observed in the UK at a given point in time. Selection itself becomes part of the parameter of interest (see also the discussion in Dustmann and Görlach, 2015).

But it is not only selective outmigration that matters for the estimation of immigrants' earnings profiles. The fact that immigrants may consider leaving the country before the end of their productive life severely shortens the pay-off period for any investment in human capital that is not fully transferable to the country of origin. Thus, immigrants’ investment into human capital is jointly determined with the optimal duration in the destination country. Dustmann and Görlach (2016a) discuss different reasons as to why a migration may be temporary, and how such temporariness affects the earnings and savings profiles of immigrants. Adda et al. (2022) take this further, by modelling the career paths of immigrants where shocks affect intended migration durations and investments into human capital.

Overall, the estimation of immigrants' earnings profiles is challenging, due to factors influencing the chosen career paths of immigrants that vary between individuals and are usually not observable for the researcher. However, for the purpose of determining how immigration affects the dynamics of inequality, all that the researcher needs to know are the observed earnings of immigrants in the destination country, where interest focuses on those of a given arrival cohort that survived until the observation year. These numbers are readily observable in survey data, such as the repeated cross-sections we use for the analysis below.

4. Effects on labour market outcomes of natives

A key question is how immigration affects the welfare of residents in the destination country. Not surprisingly, therefore, a large body of literature has developed that investigates this very issue. Most of these papers think about immigration as a ‘labour supply shock’, which shifts the labour supply curve down the demand curve. In consequence, immigration should lead to a decrease in wages (and possibly to a loss in employment) of those native groups that are in direct competition with immigrants (i.e., those who have similar skills). However, immigration may increase the productivity of factors of production that are complementary to immigrants, such as capital, or labour in other skill groups. Overall, immigration – if viewed through the lens of such a simple model and if we assume capital is internationally mobile – will only lead to wage effects if immigrants differ in their skill composition from natives; it may lead to a decline in wages of those who are similarly skilled, and possibly an increase in wages of those whom they complement. Moreover, immigration will lead to an overall surplus that accrues to those factors that are complementary to immigrants. Effects on the country of origin are simply a mirror image. Dustmann and Preston (2019) develop the effects immigration has on earnings and welfare in origin and destination countries, under various assumptions, and summarise the literature.

Alteration of factor prices is not the only way the economy of a destination country can adjust to a labour supply shock induced by immigration. Several alternative adjustment mechanisms have been suggested by which economies can absorb a labour supply shock without needing wages to change. First, immigration-induced labour supply shocks, by changing the relative price of factors of production, can be absorbed by changing the mix an economy produces. Such adjustment would be predicted for a small open economy with more traded goods than factors of production by a simple trade model such as the Heckscher–Ohlin model. In this model, where firms operate under constant returns to scale, prices of traded output goods are set in international markets, and so are (by duality) factors of production, including wages. Immigration will simply shift production towards industries that use labour represented by immigrants more intensively, thus expanding production, and absorbing the additional labour supply, with wages remaining the same. Trade will allow natives to consume the same output mix as before. This model predicts that wages remain the same; however, in such a setting, immigration will not produce a surplus.
This mechanism has been suggested by, for example, Hanson and Slaughter (2002), and is discussed by Card and Lewis (2007).

Similarly, an immigration-induced labour supply shock can also be absorbed by a change in technologies. The idea is similar to the one explained above: immigration will lead firms to adopt new technologies and adjust production such that additional labour supplies are absorbed through changes in factor shares. Again, with such adjustment, wages remain the same, and the additional labour supply will be absorbed. As with trade adjustment, there will be no migration surplus. Lewis (2011) provides evidence of technology adjustment to immigration shocks, and Dustmann and Glitz (2015) show that technology adjustment to immigration-induced labour supply shocks are likely to be more important than adjustments through the mix of output.

Empirical research concerned with estimating the causal effect of immigration on wages, output mix or technology of residents faces the classical identification challenge. Researchers observe wages of natives before and after immigration. What is not observed are counterfactual wages of residents after immigration if immigration had not taken place. The challenge for empirical work is to reproduce this missing counterfactual. The construction of this missing counterfactual is at the core of applied academic research on the impact of immigration.

A very common way to construct a counterfactual in the literature is to utilise differential immigrant inflows into different regions of a country, and to regress the change in regional wages on the immigration inflow. While this approach eliminates persistent regional differences in economic conditions, it is still bedevilled by shocks to regional economic conditions being potentially correlated with immigrant inflows: immigrants will typically settle in areas where economic conditions are favourable. To address this, many papers use variation in existing immigrant settlement across regions to instrument immigrant inflows, assuming that past settlement of immigrants is uncorrelated with future economic shocks; see, for example, Altonji and Card (1991) for an early application of this approach.

Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2013) use this identification strategy to investigate the effect immigration has along the entire distribution of native wages. In their approach, they regress native wages at points along the native wage distribution on the total immigrant inflow. Their methodology does not rely on assigning immigrants to skill cells, recognising that such pre- allocation would potentially lead to allocation different from where immigrants can be found to compete with natives, as illustrated earlier in Figure 10.

Using data from the UK LFS, we employ the same strategy for Great Britain, updating the analysis of Dustmann et al. (2013) for the period 1994–2016. We regress the changes in regional wages at percentile $p$ of the native wage distribution $\Delta \ln W_{prt}$ on the change in the regional immigrants-to-natives ratio $\Delta m_{rt}$, year fixed effects $\alpha_{pt}$ and changes in controls $\beta_p \Delta X_{rt}$, which include the average age of immigrants and natives and the log ratio of high- to low-educated and intermediate- to low-educated natives:

$$
\Delta \ln W_{prt} = \alpha_{pt} + \beta_p \Delta X_{rt} + \gamma_p \Delta m_{rt} + \Delta \varepsilon_{prt}.
$$

In the bottom panel of Figure 12, we present instrumental variable (IV) results from estimating equation (3) along the distribution of native wages, where we instrument the change in the immigrants-to-natives ratio $\Delta m_{rt}$ by the four-year lag of the ratio in levels. In the top panel of Figure 12, we plot the relative density of newly arrived immigrants along the native wage distribution. The figure is remarkably similar to that in Dustmann et al. (2013), for the period 1997–

---

16 Northern Ireland is excluded from this estimation due to insufficient data in the 1994 LFS.

17 The choice of the instrument is motivated by studies (see Bartel, 1989; Munshi, 2003) showing that settlement patterns of previously arrived immigrants are good predictors of immigrant location choices. $F$-statistics for the instrument are presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix and indicate strong correlation between the instrument and the change in the immigrants-to-natives ratio. The instrument is valid only if economic shocks, described by $\Delta \varepsilon_{prt}$, are not too persistent. We pre-formed Arellano–Bond tests and the absence of third-order autocorrelation among the errors could not be rejected. Because our instrument is based on immigrant settlement patterns from four years ago, it cannot correlate with current economic shocks. As a result, the instrument affects current wages only through current immigrant location choices and its exclusion from the main equation is justified.

18 For detailed results, see Table A.1 in the Appendix.
Dustmann, C., Kastis, Y. and Preston, I. (2022), ‘Inequality and immigration’, IFS Deaton Review of Inequalities 2005. It suggests that immigration has put a slight downward pressure on native wages at the bottom of the native wage distribution, precisely where recently arrived immigrants are more concentrated than natives. Native wages at higher percentiles of the distribution, where the concentration of immigrants is lower relative to natives, slightly increase.

More specifically, we find that an immigrant inflow of 1% of the native labour force decreases wages at the 5th and 10th percentiles of the native distribution by 0.20% and 0.24%, respectively, with estimates being statistically significant. However, a 1% inflow induces an increase of 0.05% and 0.16% of native wages at the 75th and 90th percentiles, respectively, with only the effect on the 90th percentile being statistically significant. The average increase in the immigrant-to-native ratio over the period considered was about 0.52% per year, while the real hourly wage increased by 8 pence per year at the 5th and 10th percentiles (by 1.76% and 1.56%, respectively), and by 27 pence (1.34%) per year at the 90th percentile. Therefore, immigration held back real wages by 0.47 pence and 0.64 pence per year at the 5th and 10th percentiles, while it contributed 1.68 pence per year to real wages at the 90th percentile. The effect on mean wages is insignificant and very close to zero, as shown in Table A.2 in the Appendix.

These findings suggest that immigration has slightly widened the native earnings distribution by decreasing wages at the bottom and increasing wages at the top. Moreover, immigration also affects the overall earnings distribution through composition effects, which is what we discuss in the next section.

**Figure 12. Density of recent immigrants (top panel) and effects of immigration (bottom panel) along the native wage distribution**

Note: The top panel illustrates the kernel estimated density of immigrants who arrived within the last two years in the native wage distribution in the UK. The bottom panel shows the estimated effects of immigration along the native wage distribution. The short-dashed lines in the bottom graph illustrate 5% confidence intervals.

5. Inequality and immigration

The effect of immigration on wage inequality in the destination country

There are two ways in which immigration can affect wage inequality in the destination country. First, it can change the distribution of resident wages as a result of changes in wages (as discussed above). Second, it can change the composition of the overall population. In this section, we discuss these two channels, and decompose immigration’s impact on wage inequality into these two components.

We start with a simple example. Suppose there are two labour types, unskilled and skilled, with initial numbers \( N_U \) and \( N_S \) in the native population of total size \( N \). Wages are initially \( w_U \) for the less-skilled type and \( w_S \) for the more-skilled type where \( w_S > w_U \) (and we assume away differences in hours). Thus, the average wage is \( \bar{w} = (w_U N_U + w_S N_S)/N \). The Lorenz curve for earnings – showing cumulative shares of total wages as we move up the wage distribution – is, for example, \( L_0 \) in Figure 13.

- Suppose that immigration brings an inflow of low-skilled workers. Factor prices adjust so that \( w_U \) falls relative to \( w_S \) and the Lorenz curve among native workers shifts outward to \( L_1 \), indicating an increase in inequality among the population of native workers.

- However, immigration itself introduces a group of new unskilled workers into the population so that the share of lower-paid workers in the total population is higher and the average wage in the total population lower than in the solely native population. The Lorenz curve for the whole population, including immigrants, is at \( L_2 \). Compared with \( L_1 \), both sections of the Lorenz curve have a higher slope because of the lower average wage but the point at which the slope changes has moved rightward.

Nonetheless, as drawn, the final Lorenz curve \( L_2 \) remains wholly outside the original Lorenz curve \( L_0 \), indicating an unambiguously higher inequality in the final population than in the original population.

With a more complex array of labour types and immigration bringing inflows into each of them, the effect on the Lorenz curve will be correspondingly more complex but still composed of a multiplicity of effects of this type. The impact of immigration on native wages along the distribution (as earlier illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 12) will steepen or flatten the Lorenz curve depending on whether the proportional change is greater or less than the average and the position of immigrants in the native wage distribution (as earlier illustrated in the top panel of Figure 12) will contract or expand the population proportions of wage types along the lower axis depending upon where immigrants are more and less concentrated than natives.

These effects are illustrated in an abstract example in Figure 14. In the bottom-left panel, we see wage effects illustrated along the distribution. As illustrated, they are negative at the top and bottom and positive in the middle. The slope of the Lorenz curve for natives (in the panel above) is correspondingly depressed at top and bottom and pushed upward in the middle, as indicated by the arrows. As a consequence, the final Lorenz curve for the native population crosses the original one as shown.

In the bottom-right panel, we see the location of immigrants in the native wage distribution. As drawn, they are concentrated at the top and bottom and sparse in the middle of the wage range. Moving from the distribution among natives to the distribution among the whole population including immigrants, the Lorenz curve is compressed horizontally where immigrants are rare, and expanded horizontally where they are more common, as shown in the top panel. The final Lorenz curve for the whole population accordingly crosses that for natives alone, as shown.
Figure 13. Immigration and the Lorenz curve (two labour types)

Note: The figure illustrates the change in the destination country’s Lorenz curve induced by an inflow of low-skilled immigrants in the simple case with only two types of workers, high- and low-skilled, in the labour force. The Lorenz curve for earnings before the arrival of the immigrant inflow is $L_0$. The arrival of the inflow decreased the wage of the less-skilled type and the Lorenz curve shifted outward to $L_1$. Immigration also increased the share of less-skilled workers in the population and eventually the Lorenz curve is shifted to $L_2$.

To estimate changes in the Lorenz curve induced by wage effects for the UK over the period 1994–2016, we use the estimates of the wage effects of immigration along the native wage distribution, which we presented in Section 4, to draw Figure 15, which corresponds exactly to Figure 14 but using real data. The bottom-left panel is taken from Figure 12, while the bottom-right panel illustrates the density of newly arrived immigrants along the native wage distribution, as first presented in Figure 10. Because of the size of the effects and the smallness of immigrant numbers, the shift in Lorenz curves in the upper panels are barely visible. We can conclude from these figures that the total impact immigration has had on overall inequality in wages, judged in terms of areas on Lorenz diagrams, is indeed very small (though it is rare to see appreciable movements in Lorenz curves for any reason).

Wages are only part of income and individuals may also receive income through other factors, such as capital or land, the prices of which may be influenced by immigration. Assuming that these other factors are complementary to labour of the arriving types, then increases in their returns will benefit any native owner. The distributional effect will depend upon where these owners are concentrated in the income distribution. If, for example, owners of capital or land tend to be better off than those whose income comes principally from sale of labour, then this will aggravate any inequality-worsening effect of immigration.
Figure 14. Immigration and the Lorenz curve (multiple labour types)

Note: The figure illustrates the way immigration affects the Lorenz curve, and thus wage inequality, in the destination country in the case of multiple types of workers in the labor force. The bottom-left panel shows the wage effects of immigration along the native wage distribution. The top-left panel illustrates the changes in the Lorenz curve of native wages that these effects induce. The bottom-right panel shows the location of immigrants in the native wage distribution. The top-right panel illustrates changes in the Lorenz curve of all wages, induced by changes in the composition of the labour force, if the immigrants who arrived were located on the distribution as in the panel below.

Decomposing inequality
To summarise the total impact of immigration on inequality we can calculate the effect on any of the many possible indices of inequality. Choosing a measure decomposable across subpopulations allows a breakdown of any impact into effects within and between natives and immigrants.

The Theil index (calculated as the difference between the log of arithmetic and geometric mean wage) is one example of such an index. Its decomposability allows the impact of immigration on inequality to be broken up into its different aspects.

Let \( N \) and \( M \) be the numbers of native and immigrant workers of labour type \( i \), let \( N \) and \( M \) be the total numbers of natives and immigrants, respectively, let \( m \) be the share of immigrants in the population \( M/(N+M) \), let \( w_i \) be the wage of type \( i \) and let \( \mathbf{w} \) be the vector of wages of all types. The Theil index \( T(\mathbf{w}) \) is the difference between the log of the arithmetic mean \( \bar{w} \) and geometric mean \( \bar{w} \):

\[
T(\mathbf{w}) = \ln \left[ \frac{1}{N+M} \sum_i (N_i+M_i) w_i \right] - \frac{1}{N+M} \sum_i (N_i + M_i) \ln w_i = \ln \bar{w} - \ln \bar{w}.
\]

This easily decomposes into

\[
T(\mathbf{w}) = T^N(\mathbf{w}) + m(T^M(\mathbf{w}) - T^N(\mathbf{w})) + T^B(\mathbf{w}).
\]
Figure 15. Effect of immigration on the UK Lorenz curve 1994–2016

Note: The figure shows estimated changes on the Lorenz curve for UK wages during the period 1994–2016. The blue curve in the top panels illustrates the estimated Lorenz curve without immigration. The red curve in the top-left panel shows the changes induced by the effects of immigration on the native wage distribution. The estimated effects on percentiles of the distribution are shown in the bottom-left panel. The red curve in the top-right panel illustrates the changes induced by the introduction of immigrants at percentiles in the native wage distribution according to the bottom-right panel. The blue and red curves in the upper panels nearly coincide.

Source: UK LFS.

Here, $T^N(w)$ and $T^M(w)$ measure inequality among natives and immigrants, respectively,

$$T^N(w) = \ln \left[ \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i} N_i w_i \right] - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i} N_i \ln w_i = \ln \bar{w}^N - \ln \bar{w}^N,$$

$$T^M(w) = \ln \left[ \frac{1}{M} \sum_{i} M_i w_i \right] - \frac{1}{M} \sum_{i} M_i \ln w_i = \ln \bar{w}^M - \ln \bar{w}^M,$$

and $T^B(w)$ is inequality between natives and immigrants (defined as the value of the index if all immigrants and natives each earned the mean wage of their group):

$$T^B(w) = \ln \bar{w} - (1 - m) \ln \bar{w}^N - m \ln \bar{w}^M.$$

If immigration is small, then $m$ is small and inequality will comprise mainly inequality among native workers $T^N(w)$.

We can use this decomposition to think separately about the ways in which the arrival of immigrants affects inequality.

Suppose that wages in the absence of immigration would be $w^0$. Then wage inequality without immigration would be $T^N(w^0)$ and the effect of immigration on inequality would be
\[ T(w) - T^N(w^0) = [T^N(w) - T^N(w^0)] + [m(T^M(w) - T^N(w)) + T^B(w)]. \]

The effect has two components (corresponding to the two aspects of the effect discussed in the previous section).

- First, there is the effect on inequality in the native population through changes in the rewards to different labour types \([T^N(w) - T^N(w^0)]\). It is through this term that changes in native wage inequality, arising through changes in factor prices, will be captured.

- Second, if immigrants differ from natives in the distribution of wages, then there will be a compositional effect \([m(T^M(w) - T^N(w)) + T^B(w)]\). This arises either because average wages differ so that \(T^B(w) > 0\) or because inequality within the immigrant subpopulation differs from that in the native population so that \(T^M(w) ≠ T^N(w)\).

Figure 16 illustrates the evolution of the Theil index measuring wage inequality in the UK from 1994 to 2016, where the solid blue line represents the overall inequality index, the dotted red line the index for natives, and the green dashed line the index for immigrants. In accordance with the decomposition outlined above, the solid blue line is a weighted average of the red and green lines plus the index for inequality between immigrants and natives. The last of these is, in our case, very small and is omitted from the graph. From the figure, we see that overall wage inequality (solid blue line) is consistently decreasing from 2000 onwards. Wage inequality among natives (dotted red line) is consistently lower than among the immigrant group (dashed green line) so that the compositional effect of including immigrants in the population raises inequality. The total magnitude of the compositional effect is the difference between the solid blue and dotted red lines.

**Figure 16. Theil index**

Note: The figure illustrates the evolution of the Theil index measuring overall wage inequality, within-group wage inequality for natives and within-group wage inequality for immigrants. Overall wage inequality is decomposed into within-group inequality for natives, within-group inequality for immigrants and between-group inequality for these two groups. Between-group inequality is omitted as it is close to zero. Hourly wages are deflated at 2015 prices (conditional on employment) and we trim the bottom and top 1% of the sample to exclude outliers.

In Table A.3 in the Appendix, we give our estimates for the detailed decomposition of the Theil index. In the third and fourth columns, we present our estimates for the Theil indices on wage inequality within the groups of natives and immigrants, respectively. In the fifth column, we see that, as mentioned above, between-group inequality, expressed as the difference between mean immigrant and mean native wages, does not seem to significantly add to wage inequality overall. Comparison of the fifth and sixth columns makes plain that inequality between immigrants and natives is of small, and often very small, importance in this regard compared with the difference in inequality within immigrant and native populations.

Moreover, as shown in the previous section, immigration also stretches the earnings distribution of the natives. Consequently, immigration further contributes to the rise in overall wage inequality by increasing wage inequality within the group of native workers.

**Percentile ratios**

In the last part of this section, we take a closer look at the evolution of wage inequality in the UK as documented in the previous section both across and within native and immigrant groups. We focus on the evolution of hourly wages at the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the overall, native and immigrant wage distributions. Based on the Theil index, we have shown in the previous section that even though wage inequality consistently decreased from 2000 onwards both across and within the two groups, wage inequality among immigrants was systematically higher than wage inequality among natives. This pattern can also be seen when measuring wage inequality for the UK during the same period using the 90:10 ratio (upper panel of Figure 17).

**Figure 17. Wage percentile ratios**

Note: The figure illustrates the evolution of percentile ratios of hourly wages for native and immigrant groups in the UK. Hourly wages are deflated at 2015 prices (conditional on employment) and we trim the bottom and top 1% of the sample to exclude outliers.


---

19 Our focus on the 90th and 10th percentiles misses out on movements at the very top of the distribution. Advani et al. (2020), using administrative tax data, show that immigrants are heavily over-represented at the very top of the income distribution, and concentrated in the finance sector. They conclude that 85% of the growth in the UK top 1% income share over the past 20 years can be attributed to migration.
Decomposing these movements into those above and below the median reveals some interesting differences between the two groups (see Figure 17). While, for natives, inequality decreased both above and below the median, for immigrants, the 90:50 ratio first increases (until about 2012) and then decreases, while the 50:10 ratio decreases from 2000 onwards. Thus, the overall decrease in wage inequality was driven by a significant reduction of wage inequality at the bottom half of the wage distribution, which overcompensates for the increase in wage inequality in the top half of the wage distribution.

Figure 18(a) illustrates that the reduction in wage inequality at the bottom half of the immigrant distribution is mainly driven by a persistent increase in the wage at the 10th percentile of the immigrant distribution that started towards the end of the 1990s. As wages at the 10th percentile of the native distribution experienced the same, or even slightly greater, increase too (see Figure 18(b)), this is likely to be driven by subsequent rises of the minimum wage during this period. Lindley and Machin (2013) illustrate that the National Minimum Wage (NMW) grew faster than average earnings in the UK during the period 1999–2010. They argue that this significantly benefited female workers at the lower end of the wage distribution, leading to a substantial reduction in lower-tail wage inequality.20 This is in line with our findings in Figure 17, where the 50:10 ratios for both native and immigrant workers have been declining during the same period, even though the downward trend has been more persistent for immigrants.21

6. Other effects on inequality and immigration attitudes

So far, effects through affecting the distribution wages have been the primary focus of this chapter. However, immigration can also affect inequality in other dimensions.

Fiscal effect of immigration
One such channel is through fiscal effects. Immigrants pay taxes and impose a burden on public finances through the use of public services and consumption of publicly provided goods in ways that can relax or tighten the government’s fiscal position in destination countries (Preston, 2014). Because the net fiscal contributions of individuals depend upon demographic type and on economic position, the balance will depend upon the age and labour market position of immigrants at arrival and on the way in which demographic and economic status evolves over the duration of immigrants’ period in the destination country, as discussed in earlier sections. There is no general answer as to whether immigration should affect public finances negatively or positively, though the best accounting for the UK points to a clear overall fiscal gain.

Dustmann and Frattini (2014), in an assessment over the period between 2001 and 2011 of all immigrants who arrived in the UK since 2000, find that their net fiscal contributions have been positive throughout, and particularly so for immigrants from countries in the European Economic Area. Breaking down different immigrant groups further, they note the strong positive contribution made by immigrants from countries that joined the EU in 2004 – a finding that contrasted sharply with claims in some of the media and in public debate at the time.22 Over the same period, the net fiscal contribution of natives has been negative on average, in line with the overall deficit that the UK ran during this time. Reasons for the overall positive fiscal contributions of immigrants are, among others, their higher labour market participation and their lower receipt of benefits and transfers.

20 Lindley and Machin (2013) show that the rises in NMW benefited female more than male workers at the bottom of the distribution during 1999–2010. For immigrants, we find that both female and male wages at the 10th percentile of the immigrant distribution rose by the same amount.

21 The downward trend in the 50:10 ratio has been more persistent for immigrants, even though native wages rose more than immigrant wages at the 10th percentile of the distribution, because the native median wage rose more than the immigrant median wage during this period.

Figure 18. Immigrant and native wage percentiles

(a) Immigrant

(b) Native

Note: The figure illustrates the evolution of the 90th, 50th and 25th percentiles of the immigrant and native (hourly) wage distributions in the UK. Immigrants are defined as foreign-born individuals. Hourly wages are deflated at 2015 prices (conditional on employment) and we trim the bottom and top 1% of the sample to exclude outliers.

The policy question that analysis by Dustmann and Frattini (2014) addresses is: ‘what is the net fiscal contribution of immigrants who arrived between years 2001 and 2011 over that same period?’ By focusing on cohorts who are observed in the data since arrival, their analysis is transparent and does not require strong assumptions. However, it has little to say about immigrants’ net fiscal contributions over their entire migration cycle. This question is addressed in work by Dustmann et al. (2022) who add a dynamic and forward-looking element that adds, to past contributions, predictions of future contributions for cohorts who arrived in the UK after 2004. Thus, they address issues such as ageing of immigrant cohorts, which may lead to more welfare reliance in future but will also capture immigrants’ future income growth. Moreover, their analysis accounts for outmigration, which leads immigrants to contribute when young, but to leave the country when older and less productive. Their analysis finds likewise a substantially positive net fiscal contribution of immigrants not just over the observation window of the data, but over their entire migration cycle, which is again particularly large for immigrants from EU countries.

While these studies therefore draw a positive picture of immigrants’ net fiscal contribution, the fact that immigrants pay on average more than enough in taxes to cover the cost of the burdens that they impose on the public sector does not mean that the fiscal effects will not be differentially spread across the resident population. How the government responds to the beneficial effect on public finances will be the consequence of political choice. Any increase in public spending need not be concentrated on those services most affected by the burdens imposed by immigration and, because the benefits of different items of public spending are not similarly spread across the population, the net effect on the lives of different groups within the population may differ.

Furthermore, while most taxes are paid into the central exchequer, much of public service delivery is local and adjustments to public spending need not match the geographic pattern of immigration, with the consequence again that the net impact may be uneven. Health, education and policing are all, for example, public spending items delivered locally, which could be affected by immigration. While economic evidence does not support the fears often expressed in public discourse that migrants impose disproportionate burdens on any of these services, it will inevitably be true that those burdens which are imposed will be correlated spatially with immigration and any instances of immigration concentrated in poorer areas and unmatched by appropriate redirection of public funds could aggravate inequality.

An example is government spending in the UK on services such as health, social care, education and policing in the 2000s. Although immigrants who arrived in the 2000s paid more in terms of taxes than they received in transfers and benefits (see Dustmann and Frattini, 2014), they naturally increased demand for certain publicly provided goods and services in localities where they were concentrated (see a discussion on the impact of immigration on public spending in Preston, 2014). This, in conjunction with austerity programmes introduced after the Great Recession and reductions in public spending on social care, policing and health services, may have led to local supply problems. Immigration was typically blamed for shortages of service provision23 (not just by part of the press, but also by politicians, keen to deflect responsibility for the hardship austerity imposed on some24).25 Thus, while immigrants (in contrast to natives) paid more in terms of taxes than they received in transfers and benefits over the period, shortfalls in service provision due to overall austerity cuts and failure to allocate funds locally according to demand and population projections may have disadvantaged some.


‘When immigration is too high [...] it’s difficult for schools and hospitals and core infrastructure like housing and transport to cope.’ (Theresa May, Conservative Party Conference 2015).

Similar arguments were expressed in popular press as well. For example, ‘Net migration at that volume... puts pressure on infrastructure, such as housing and transport – and public services, such as schools and hospitals’, editorial by Theresa May in The Times, 29 August 2015, and ‘Theresa May must cut immigration to reduce pressure on public services and give hard-working Brits a pay rise’, The Sun, 16 August 2016, https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1618263/theresa-may-must-cut-immigration-to-reduce-pressure-on-public-services-and-give-hard-working-brits-a-pay-rise/.
Perceived disadvantage and attitudes towards immigration policies

While the empirical evidence shows clearly that effects on the resident population through labour market competition or fiscal impact are, on average, small or positive, these effects may however be perceived differently by different population groups. Is it the case that those groups that are more likely to compete with immigrants are also more hostile towards immigration, and are those who are competing with immigrants for public funds, or whose tax contributions fund welfare payments, more critical about immigration? Are differences in attitudes across different groups explained by perceived economic disadvantage arising from immigration? Or are other factors, such as objections to cultural change or racial prejudice against arriving immigrants, dominant in the way attitudes towards immigration and immigration policies are formed? These are important questions as they help us to understand better how governments can balance the need of industry for immigrant labour with the resistance to immigration among some in the resident population.

Dustmann and Preston (2005), in a study of views of UK residents on the economic effects of immigration, compare concern about labour market competition or public finances in explaining views as to whether immigration is good or bad for the economy. To elicit what economic theory would predict about the formation of such views across different groups, they first develop a simple equilibrium model that illustrates that immigration can have an impact on natives in several ways. First, it can alter labour market outcomes if the skill mix among immigrants differs from that of the current workforce, and if the economy reacts to changes in the skill mix through wage adjustments (effects discussed in previous sections). Secondly, immigration can increase or alleviate the tax burden. If immigrants contribute less through taxes and/or consume more out of public services than residents, then the implied additional tax burden may fall more heavily on the rich, therefore creating distributional effects in earnings after taxes. Such effects may be aggravated by possible employment effects potentially increasing the tax burden for the economically active in the resident workforce. Thus, consideration about benefit and cost from immigration should include not only labour market competition, but also taxes and public burden, as well as general welfare effects determined by efficiency considerations. All these can have different impacts on different groups in the population and could explain differences in the formation of views about immigration’s economic effects. The empirical analysis of Dustmann and Preston (2005) suggests that concerns regarding economic competition are dominated by fears about the public finance burden, with the latter being particularly salient among the better off. They also illustrate a strong relationship between education and more positive attitudes towards various issues relating to migration.

The association between hostility to immigration with certain indicators of respondents’ economic status, in particular with education, is well established across many surveys in many countries (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Early work (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001) regarded this as evidence for a harsher impact of immigration on the less-advantaged, compatible with labour market competition disadvantaging those who compete with immigrants, as discussed earlier. However, this explanation is difficult to reconcile with a deeper investigation of correlations within survey data or with experimental evidence.

An example of such work is Dustmann and Preston (2007), who aimed at understanding whether racial and cultural concerns about immigration may affect views about immigration policies. They distinguish between three channels that determine attitudes to further immigration: labour market concern, welfare concern, and racial or cultural concern. Based on data from the British Social Attitudes Survey from 1983 to 1990, they compare the relative magnitude of association of attitudes to further immigration of the three channels across immigrant groups of different origin. In line with Dustmann and Preston (2005) using the same data, they show that welfare concerns appear to be a more important driver of attitudes than labour market concerns. This is particularly the case in groups with a high welfare dependence, but strongest among respondents who are likely to be the biggest contributors if immigration induces a tax-financed increase in welfare dependency. Moreover, they show that opposition towards further immigration is strongly related to the proposed origin of immigrants, with much larger resistance the more ethnically distinct the immigrant population is. The presence within the data of questions directly addressing aspects of racial prejudice allows investigation of its role in
attitude formation. Racial prejudice turns out not only to be a very important component to attitudes towards immigration on average but it is also especially pronounced for immigration from countries with ethnically different populations. Racial prejudice is also particularly important as an underlying channel that drives overall attitudes for the low-skilled, suggesting that the divide in attitudes toward further immigration between the high- and low-educated is due to differences in racial prejudice rather than economic concern.

Card, Dustmann and Preston (2012) study these questions in more detail. They draw on excellent data from the European Social Survey in 2002 (covering 21 European countries) that stemmed from a purpose-built questionnaire supplement developed by the same authors to elicit the drivers to attitudes towards immigration (see Card, Dustmann and Preston, 2005). In this survey, questions were asked that dealt directly with the cultural consequences of immigration – its effect on social tensions, its effect on cultural richness and the desirability of social homogeneity in several dimensions. Distinguishing between economic (combining fiscal and competition concerns) and cultural concerns, they find that expressions of cultural concern are considerably more strongly (by a factor of 3 to 5) associated with attitudes towards a more or less lenient immigration policy than are economic concerns. Moreover, they establish that the greater antipathy to immigration of less-educated respondents is poorly explained by economic concern but more strongly by differences in cultural conservatism. In line with these findings, and surveying a large body of literature, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) conclude that the hypothesis of labour market competition as an explanation for attitudes is a repeatedly disproven ‘zombie theory’.

This suggests that the way immigration has an impact on different groups of natives through labour market competition or its fiscal consequences only partly affects individuals’ views on immigration policy. While there is some evidence that those who may feel competition from immigrants in the labour market or for transfers and benefits, and those who feel the tax burden of any negative fiscal effects, are more concerned about immigration, these channels are overshadowed by racial and cultural concerns. Thus, if one were to design migration and redistribution policies that reflect the costs and benefits that immigration brings to different groups, one is faced with three challenges. First, immigration’s economic and fiscal effects may be positive, but any such gain needs to be redistributed in a way that compensates those who may lose from immigration. Our discussion of the fiscal effects of immigration and the access to public services illustrates this. Secondly, whatever careful assessment of evidence may suggest about immigration’s economic gains and costs, this may not be reflected in common perception and such perception may respond slowly – if at all – to dissemination of research. Thirdly, the influence of perceived economic and fiscal consequences of immigration may have only limited influence on how individuals form their attitudes about what immigration policy should look like. Instead, evidence suggests that such views are more associated with racial and cultural concerns.

Why individuals form views about immigration that are less related to differences in immigration’s economic consequences, but are more reflective of cultural concerns, is of course a key question. Similarly, why are such non-economic concerns differently established across different groups? One reason may be differences in intensity or type of exposure to immigrants experienced by different groups, with the more-educated having contact with (more-educated) immigrants and thus being more likely to be positively oriented and feeling less competitive anxiety. Another reason may be social desirability bias that is differently pronounced across different groups, such as the more- and less-educated (see, e.g., work by Creighton, Jamal and Malancu, 2015). Understanding the factors that are not economically motivated but contribute to the formation of attitudes to immigration is of key importance, in particular in view of

26 Questions concern personal acceptability of racial intermarriage within families and of having a racial different superior at work and self-assessed racial prejudice. Specifically: ‘Do you think most people in Britain would mind (or not mind) if one of their close relatives were to marry a person of Asian/West Indian origin? ... and you personally? Would you mind or not mind?’; ‘Do you think most people in Britain would mind (or not mind) if a suitably qualified person of Asian/West Indian origin were appointed as their boss? ... and you personally? Would you mind or not mind?’; ‘How would you describe yourself? As very prejudiced against people of other races, a little prejudiced, or not prejudiced at all?’

27 Social-desirability bias is a bias that results from survey respondents answering questions in a way that that will be favourably viewed by others.
immigration being a dominant agenda item for right-wing populist parties (see, e.g., Dustmann, Vasiljeva and Damm, 2019).

7. Conclusions

In this chapter, we investigate the relationship between immigration and inequality in the UK over the past 40 years. Over this period, the share of foreign-born individuals in the UK rose from 5.3% in 1975 to 13.4% in 2015, with a significant increase in the share of those born in A8 countries between 2005 and 2015. Work and family reunification have been the most common reasons behind immigration of EU nationals, while inflows of non-EU nationals have been largely driven by study purposes. We document that immigrants have been systematically better-educated than natives in the UK throughout the 40 years of our observation period. Nevertheless, in line with Dustmann et al. (2013), we find that immigrants downgrade upon their arrival in the UK by working in jobs that are in substantially lower earnings categories than where they would be allocated based on their education alone. We provide evidence that as immigrants spend more time in the UK and acquire complementary skills or transfer their existing skill sets to the particularities of the UK, they move to jobs higher up in the earnings distribution.

As for the interplay between immigration and inequality, we find that immigrant inflows to the UK between 1994 and 2016 very mildly stretched the native earnings distribution. We also illustrate that wage inequality among immigrants was systematically higher than wage inequality within the group of natives throughout the period 1994–2016, so that inequality in the population including immigrants was slightly higher than in the population of natives alone. However, the overall effects of immigration on inequality in the UK were very small.

Finally, we report that wage inequality in the UK significantly decreased from 2000 onwards within both the native and immigrant groups. Examining the trend of these two groups in isolation reveals that while inequality decreased at both the top and bottom of the native earnings distribution, it increased in the top half of the immigrant distribution. This was because of decreasing median wages from the mid-2000s onwards, possibly linked to the numbers of less-skilled workers from the A8 countries after 2004. However, the decrease in the median wage, together with an increase at the bottom decile of the distribution, likely caused by subsequent rises in the national minimum wage, led to a significant reduction in wage inequality among immigrants in the bottom half of the distribution. This reduction in wage inequality at the bottom overcompensated for the increase at the top, with overall immigrant wage inequality consistently decreasing since the early 2000s.

Overall, therefore, we conclude that immigration has had only very small effects on the distribution of native wages. Neither the effect of immigration on the distribution of wages through inducing changes in the price of labour nor its effect through affecting the composition of the wage-earning population are at all sizeable. We also show that another channel – the impact of immigration on the fiscal budget, and the potentially unequal impact of the ensuing tax implications on natives – are, at least for the UK, not a factor that creates disadvantage as immigrants are large net fiscal contributors. However, the distribution of the net fiscal benefits that immigration brings is determined by politics, and the non-response to demand fluctuations partly caused by immigration may lead to harmful consequences for some groups of natives. It is the responsibility of politicians, both locally and nationally, to appropriately respond to immigration-induced changes in the demand for publicly funded goods and services.

Work that studies the impact that possibly expected distributional consequences of migration may have on attitudes shows that economic factors explain a small part of the gap between the well-educated (and therefore potential beneficiaries of immigration) and the less well-educated. Evidence suggests this gap has more to do with racial and cultural concerns being differently felt across these groups.
Appendix

Figure A.1. International population shares of immigrants

Note: The figure illustrates the shares (%) of immigrants over the total population across different countries in 2019. The horizontal line is the 2019 average for the countries displayed in the figure weighted by their total populations.

Source: UN International Migrant Stock 2019.

Figure A.2. Tertiary educated immigrants across countries in 2019

Note: The figure shows shares (%) of tertiary educated immigrants across different countries in 2019.

Source: Eurostat and Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Figure A.3. Predicted densities of immigrant cohorts on the native wage distribution

Note: The figure illustrates kernel estimates of predicted densities of immigrant cohorts that arrived 0-2, 4-6 and 14-16 years ago in the non-immigrant wage distribution. Immigrant wages are predicted solely based on education. Hourly wages are deflated at 2015 prices (conditional on employment) and we trim the bottom and top 1% of the sample to exclude outliers.

Table A.1. Effect of immigration on wage distribution: impact on different wage percentiles, 1994–2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>First differences</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>IV (four-period lag)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th percentile</td>
<td>−0.024</td>
<td>−0.110</td>
<td><strong>−0.186</strong></td>
<td><strong>−0.198</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th percentile</td>
<td>−0.097</td>
<td>−0.125</td>
<td><strong>−0.234</strong></td>
<td><strong>−0.241</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th percentile</td>
<td>−0.004</td>
<td>−0.065</td>
<td><strong>−0.183</strong></td>
<td><strong>−0.188</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50th percentile</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th percentile</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90th percentile</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>−0.056</td>
<td><strong>0.185</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.160</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th percentile</td>
<td>−0.196</td>
<td>−0.234</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-stat for significance of excluded instruments</td>
<td></td>
<td>1855.510</td>
<td>1618.660</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial R² for first-stage regression</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year dummies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other controls</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Entries are the estimated regression coefficients of the ratio of immigrants to natives in regressions of different natives' wage percentiles on the ratio of immigrants to natives for years 1994–2016. ‘Other controls’ include average age of natives and immigrants, and the logarithm of the ratio of natives of each education group to natives with no qualifications. Northern Ireland is excluded from the regressions as there are no data in 1994. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significant (at the 95% level) coefficients are in bold.

Source: UK LFS.
### Table A.2. Effect of immigration on average wages, 1994–2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th><strong>First differences</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>IV (four-period lag)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>−0.002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust average</td>
<td>−0.019</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage index</td>
<td>−0.063</td>
<td>−0.063</td>
<td>−0.063</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust index</td>
<td>−0.056</td>
<td>−0.066</td>
<td>−0.072</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F-stat for significance of excluded instruments</strong></td>
<td>1855.510</td>
<td>1618.660</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partial R² for first-stage regression</strong></td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year dummies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other controls</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are the estimated regression coefficients of the ratio of immigrants to natives in regressions of different measures of natives’ average wages on the ratio of immigrants to natives for years 1994–2016. Robust average wages are computed by trimming the wage distribution at the (region- and year-specific) top and bottom percentiles. The wage index is the weighted log sum of the average wage of each education group, using time-invariant weights. Its robust version uses the trimmed distribution to compute education-specific averages. ‘Other controls’ include average age of natives and immigrants, and the logarithm of the ratio of natives in each education group to natives with no qualifications. Northern Ireland is excluded from the regressions as there are no data in 1994. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Source: UK LFS.
Table A.3. Decomposition of the Theil index measuring wage inequality over 1994–2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>( T(w) )</th>
<th>within natives ( T^N(w) )</th>
<th>within immigrants ( T^I(w) )</th>
<th>between-group ( T^B(w) )</th>
<th>Compositional effect of immigration ( m[T^I(w) - T^N(w)] + T^B(w) )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0.150</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>0.00039</td>
<td>0.00156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.00039</td>
<td>0.00211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.00035</td>
<td>0.00191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.00023</td>
<td>0.00271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.00032</td>
<td>0.00242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.150</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.00036</td>
<td>0.00201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.00037</td>
<td>0.00172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.172</td>
<td>0.00052</td>
<td>0.00246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.00035</td>
<td>0.00243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.00020</td>
<td>0.00130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.00018</td>
<td>0.00183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.00008</td>
<td>0.00154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.00001</td>
<td>0.00284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.00000</td>
<td>0.00260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.00003</td>
<td>0.00237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.00001</td>
<td>0.00274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.00004</td>
<td>0.00316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.00003</td>
<td>0.00294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.00001</td>
<td>0.00295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.00005</td>
<td>0.00307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.00003</td>
<td>0.00333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.00018</td>
<td>0.00304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.00005</td>
<td>0.00297</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The entries in this table give the detailed decomposition of the Theil Index over native and immigrant groups. The second column includes values of the Theil index for the whole population (overall wage inequality) for each year. The third and fourth columns include values of the Theil index on inequality within the native and immigrant groups, respectively. Between-group inequality is shown in the fifth column and it is very close to zero. The last column illustrates our estimate for the compositional effect of immigration on inequality (i.e. for the inequality induced by the fact that immigrants differ from natives in the distribution of wages). Hourly wages are deflated at 2015 prices (conditional on employment) and we trim the bottom and top 1% of the sample to exclude outliers.

Source: UK LFS.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Citizenships granted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>144,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>155,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>148,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>158,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>125,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>196,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>186,672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>170,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>183,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>190,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>115,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>105,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>132,221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Grants to previously non-EU citizens are computed by subtracting the grants given to previously EU citizens from the grants given in total.

Source: Home Office Immigration Statistics.
References


